On Collective Security

In order to fully understand the concept of collective security, it is important to briefly mention a few things about the time period the concept first was brought into light. The concept of collective security came to be widely discussed after WWI, when many regarded the balance of power politics no longer acceptable. Woodrow Wilson (the liberal president of USA at that time) argued that balance of power policies “violated democracy and national self-determination” (Nye, Joseph, Understanding International Conflicts, 2005:86) and was therefore regarded as immoral and as simply a way for the sovereign states to preserve their power. Instead, Wilson claimed that the world would be a much safer place if “security [was] a collective responsibility” (Nye, 2005:87), and therefore he introduced the concept of collective security, where the League of Nations would work as both a moral and military force. And this has become the dominating bearing principle in the United Nations charter today.
First, let us take a closer look at what this system means and what characterizes the system of collective security. It is important to mention that this system is a peace enforcement method and not a peace-keeping method, and it operates after the well known principle: one for all – all for one. In this system all aggressions are of concern for everyone, which means that if one state acts as an aggressor, the other states will put their arsenal of military forces together in order to attack the aggressor. This is the principle of the entire collective security system, and these military coercive measures are stated in Article 42 in the United Nations charter today. This system is not the same as a selective system of military alliances (NATO); instead it is a security system for all states in the entire collective; and it works as a worldwide protection. Because, just as Nye claims;
“if all nonaggressive states banded together, the preponderance of power would be on the side of the good. International security would be a collective responsibility in which nonaggressive countries would form a coalition against aggressors. Peace would be indivisible” (Nye, 2005:87).
According to Nye there are a few differences between the former balance of power system and the collective security system. And these differences might be of importance to highlight, in order to be able to characterize the collective security system completely. This new system focused on “the aggressive policies of a state” (Nye, 2005:87) instead of focusing on how strong a state was becoming, and according to that evaluate it as a potential threat. Also, there would be no danger of threatening alliances forming around the world, because alliances would not be formed in advance. Instead a worldwide alliance would be formed against the aggressor after it executed an aggressive action towards another state. Last, in comparison to the balance of power system, this system is a global system where everyone must be involved in order for it to work. And states must be willing to “voluntarily give up some sovereignty to the international community in return for the guarantees of collective security and international law” (Nye, 2005:88), which means that it works internationally as the police force works domestically.
Also, in order to make this system work, there are certain guidelines that have to be established. First, there must be some kind of consensus that aggression is illegal and that a threat is a threat towards “us”. Second, there must be an obligation for all states to be supportive with troops. Third, there has to be some kind of organisation that regulates the appointed troops.
When discussing collective security, one needs to take into account that there are both advantages and problems with this system. First, it has been critiqued for being a naive and utopian system, because states might not want to provide automatic help to countries if it does not lie in their own interest. It is a good thought, but in reality it might not work. Examples of this will follow later, when the Ethiopian conflict and the Iraq-Kuwait conflict is discussed further on. Also, the collective security system will have the effect that small and insignificant conflicts will become worldwide battles, where everyone will be pulled into a state of war that might not seem relevant. And even if the collective would be able to take down the aggressor, it is still a risk to involve everyone in all conflicts. Moreover, the system establishes status quo, and it is an unfair system when it comes to the veto system; where five permanent states have the right to stop decisions today (in the days of the League of Nations, all states had the right to veto). This means that the superpowers can still choose to stay out of certain conflicts; which also make the system very ineffective. Also, this system assumes that all states concerned are equally sensitive about the pressure from other states, which might not be true in reality. Another problem with this system is that there is not a generally accepted definition of “aggression”; which leads to a problem when dealing with acts of prevention and pre-emption. Last, many people are under the opinion (pacifists of course) that it should not be the United Nations task to pursue wars. And the system of collective security would require greater worldwide militarization than the politics of alliances would, which might be a danger with the system.
Further, even though Woodrow Wilson pushed this organisation of international security very hard, the weakness with the League of Nations was early noted when the United States did not want to join after all. And this was a great backlash for Wilson, since the United States would have been the Leagues most important country. If the United States would have joined, the guarantee for worldwide security would have been stronger. Instead, countries engaged in smaller alliances that went against the system of collective security in order to feel safe. Even though it was a success that Germany joined in 1925, and that “[t]he League managed to settle some minor disputes, such as one between Greece and Bulgaria” (Nye, 2005:90) the crisis in Manchuria and Ethiopia eradicated the optimism about the system, where it became obvious that the system was “slow, cautious, and totally ineffective” (Nye, 2005:92). For example, when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, the League of Nations established sanctions, which was believed to be enough incitement for Italy to withdraw its troops, but they did not do anything else. Instead the main countries of the League (Britain and France) were worried about the fact that Germany was getting stronger, and they wanted Italy to join forces with them against Germany. This lead to that the conflict in Africa was overlooked, because of the distance to that war in comparison to the indicators of a rising conflict in Europe. Instead these countries choose to restore the balance of power in Europe, and overthrew the collective security system, which eventually led to WWII. (Nye, 2005:90-92).
But, after the cold war it has become easier to discuss international interventions, and the U.N. seem to have become more involved in international conflicts. In the U.N. charter under chapter seven, the collective security system is discussed as peace enforcement, where an intervention of a state is allowed if that state threatens the world peace and security. Article 43 in the U.N. charter regulates the appointment of troops. The Security Council leads the troops centrally and they also have the political responsibility for the troops. The system of collective security has never taken into action when it comes to U.N., but the Security Council can execute mandates for military actions, but that means that they will have no control over what is done in its name. For example, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 2nd, 1990, it was considered a threat against world peace, and it was agreed that an intervention was necessary. But instead the U.N. delegated mandates to the Coalition of the Willing (which was led by Americans), where the USA could affect all the political directives. The steady reports they were to submit to the Security Council, only arrived after having undergone certain processes within the US (censorship), which meant that the Security Council did not have any influence over neither tactics nor politics in this war. This is a problematic development of the collective security system. Interventions seem to be exercised only in the cases where there are political and strategic interests. And the fact that the USA can use its interests and intervene in conflicts in the name of the U.N., but still decide over all political directives and tactics is wrong.
To conclude, the system of collective security sounds very great in theory, but since the veto system exists for the five most important players it is very ineffective. Countries (especially USA) often only want to intervene in conflicts if it is in their own interest, which is not how it is supposed to be. And even if USA is part of U.N., the 2003 Iraqi invasion clearly shows that USA very well can act on its own in the world today, without anyone being able to stop them. Since it is very hard to define an “aggressor”, the pre-emptive/preventive wars have become ambiguous. Who is really the aggressor? I think that since the U.N. never considered Saddam a clear, sufficient and imminent threat in 2003, would not USA then be viewed as a country that clearly threatens world peace after they declared war on Iraq? The attack will not only have many effects on the world; there amongst increased terrorism, but it is also a fact that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, which makes the attack clearly unacceptable. But since the U.N. never will attack the superpower USA, George W Bush might continue his democratization of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran followed by Iraq. I think that USA has managed very well to achieve their obvious goal: to make U.N. ineffective. And it is just another proof of that the system of collective security unfortunately does not work in practice.

Works Cited

Lindbom Schultz, Helena. Krig I Vår Tid. Studentlitteratur Lund: 2002.
Nye, Joseph S. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. 5th ed. Pearson Education, Inc; 2005.Notes from lectures